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RETROSPECTIVITY RECONSIDERED 
T. KOOPMANS • 
I. THE PRosPEcnVITY PRoBLEM 
IN its judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. Sabena, the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities gave an interpretation to the 
provisions of Article 119 of the E.E.C. Treaty, on equal pay of male 
and female workers, which caused some stir. 1 The Court held that 
the equal pay rule had direct effect, in the sense that any female 
worker could appeal to it in proceedings against her employer 
before courts or tribunals of any of the Member States. This ruling 
embodied a novel interpretation of Article 119: not only because 
the Court itself had not yet applied its doctrine of direct effect to 
this article, but also because most of the authors on the subject had 
come to a different conclusion.2 The Court seems to have been aware 
of the practical problems which might result from such a situation; 
it added some considerations on what it called the " temporal 
effect" of its judgment. Its decision " might," it said, result in the 
introduction of claims by female workers dating back to the time 
when the direct effect of Article 119 came about (1963 for the" old" 
Member States!) 3 ; therefore, it developed a certain number of 
reasons for deciding that " important considerations of legal cer-
tainty affecting aJl the interests involved " made it impossible to 
reopen the question as regards the past. Only workers who had 
already brought legal proceedings at the date of the judgment could 
benefit from the direct effect. 
The European Court of Human Rights-the Strasbourg Court-
relied on this part of the Defrenne judgment when it had to consider 
whether Belgian legislation on the legal position of illegitimate 
children was contrary to certain provisions of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. In the Marckx case, it held that Belgium 
had actually violated the Convention by restricting rights of illegiti-
mate children, such as inheritance rights, as compared to those 
enjoyed by legitimate children.• However, the Court recognised 
• Judge at the Court or Justice of the European Communities; 1965-78 Professor 
or Law, University of Leyden, Netherlands; 1976-77 visiting fellow eommoner, 
Trinity College, Cambridge. 
t Case 43/75, De{renne v . Sabena [1976] E.C.R. 481. 
2 See, generally, 0. Stocker, "Le second arret De.frenne: l'egalite des rt!munt!rations 
des travaiUeurs masculins et de travalleurs ftminins," 13 Cah.Dr.Eur. 180 (1977). 
3 See the text of Art. 119, par. I, E.E.C. 
4 Eur.Ct. Human Rights, 13 June 1979, Marc/ex case, Series A, no. 31. 
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that the Belgian Government had "an evident interest" in knowing 
what the " temporal effect " of its judgment would be. It referred 
explicitly to the Defrenne judgment in support of its conclusion 
that "the principle of legal certainty, which is necessarily inherent 
in the law of the Convention as in Community law, dispenses the 
Belgian State from reopening legal acts or situations that antedate 
the delivery of the present judgment." 
The problem we should like to discuss concerns what both Courts 
call, in French-sounding English, the " temporal effect " of judicial 
rulings on the interpretation of existing law. It arises in cases in 
which a court gives a new interpretation to a certain rule of law, 
or to a legal principle (new as compared to its earlier case law, or 
new as compared to existing practice), and in which citizens, or 
business corporations, or administrative agencies, had no reason 
to foresee such a change. The question is then whether rulings of 
this kind should be considered as part of the rule of law they set out 
to interpret, and therefore apply retrospectively from the moment 
this rule of law came into force, or whether they should be con-
sidered as "new law," and therefore apply only to future cases. 
Framed in that way, the question presupposes that the normal system 
is one of retrospectivity, and this is in fact what most lawyers will take 
for granted.6 Ha court interprets a legal provision, the interpretation 
it gives will normally be regarded as part and parcel of that provision 
since its inception; that means, in other words, that the effects of the 
judgment are retroactive, because the court, in applying its inter-
pretation to the case at hand, implicitly assumes that it will apply 
the same interpretation to any case on the same problem-whether 
it arose before or after the court gave its interpretation, and whether 
it is based on facts occurring before or after that moment. 
American legal authors give a more prominent place to our 
problem than their European colleagues. The " prospectivity debate " 
came in full swing in 1965, when the federal Supreme Court delivered 
its judgment in Linkletter v. Walker. s The case concerned the 
" temporal effect " of a rule the Supreme Court had previously 
announced in one of its most strikingly innovating judgments on 
criminal procedure, Mapp v. Ohio.1 Mapp itself was more or less 
at the junction of two new lines of thought which had been gradually 
developed by the Supreme Court, the " exclusionary rule " and the 
"incorporation doctrine." The first of these was to the effect that 
the interdiction of unreasonable searches and seizures, included in 
s See, among others, D. Wyatt, " Prospective effect or a holding of direct applica-
bility" [1976) E.L.Rev. 399. 
• Linkleuer v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
7 M app v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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the American Bill of Rights,' implied that evidence obtained in 
violation of it could under no condition contribute to the conviction 
of the suspect. The second doctrine extended the guarantees pro-
vided for by the federal Bill of Rights to cases arising under state 
law, on the basis of the constitutional provision that no state shall 
" deprive any person of life, liberty and property without due process 
of law " 9-which meant, according to the court, that safeguards 
to be respected by the states should be comparable, or even identical, 
to those imposed on federal authorities by the Bill of Rights. The 
importance of this " incorporation doctrine " was of course that the 
safeguards to be respected by the state consisted of constitutional pro-
visions as interpreted by the federal Supreme Court, as the Mapp case 
was to show. It concerned the question whether the exclusionary rule 
applies to a state case, if the Jaw of the state expressly denies that 
rule. The court had no difficulty in finding reasons for an affirmative 
answer 10; it thereby handed down one of the most famous, but 
also one of the most debated, decisions of the Warren Court. 
After Mapp was delivered, Mr. Linkletter attacked his con-
viction, allegedly obtained on the basis of illegal evidence; he did 
so not on direct review, his conviction being final, but by means of 
collateral attack (in the American systems of criminal procedure, 
the convict has frequent occasions to challenge his conviction). 
The Supreme Court inferred from this situation that the convict 
sought a retroactive benefit from a newly announced rule ; it thought, 
however, that retroactivity was not a necessary consequence of 
such a new rule. Therefore, it said, it had to look at the exigencies 
of the situation, and after having done so it concluded that in this 
case the convict could not benefit from the rule. In itself, the 
Linkletter judgment may not have been very important; but it 
opened up some new ways of thinking. After 1965, the non-retro-
activity concept has been gradually expanded to many major 
changes of criminal procedure which the Supreme Court brought 
about on the basis of the Bill of Rights; it was also applied to some 
other judicial rulings.11 This case law, in its turn, gave rise to many 
comments in American law reviews, purporting to look for " the 
Link/ell er rationale." Notes on Defrenne often refer to the body 
of doctrine which is taking shape in the United States. 12 
Before actually looking into the difficulties which the concept 
of prospectivity involves, we shall try to distinguish it from two corn-
s Amendm. IV, U.S. Constitution. 
g Amendm. XIV, s. 1, U.S. Constitution. 
'1 Justice~ Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker dissenting. 
11 For example, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. 4()4 U.S. 97 (1971). 
u For example, Waiter van Gerven, " Contribution de I' arret Defrenne au d~veloppe­
ment du droit communautaire," 13 Cah.Dr.Eur. 131 (1977). 
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parable but not quite similar notions. The first of these is the case 
of purely " admonitory " functions of courts : the court, for instance 
a constitutional court, raises grave doubts about the constitutionality 
of certain legislation, and it exhorts the legislature to reform the 
law in order to make it compatible with the constitution. 13 Legislative 
bodies may then enact new measures, either with retroactive effect 
or ex nunc, as they think fit; if they fail to act, they run the risk of 
having the old legislation struck down as unconstitutional. No 
prospectivity problem arises for the admonishing court, as its 
decision does not make any change in the law, but only enjoins 
others to do so. a The second comparable but dissimilar problem 
concerns the legal effects of acts annulJed by a court; it arises for 
courts exercising powers of judicial review of legislation or of 
administrative acts. Annulment is, of course, the very power of the 
court to rule about the past : it is retroactive by definition. How-
ever, the effects of annulment are often mitigated by particular 
constitutional or legal rules; thus. Article 174 of the E.E.C. Treaty 
provides that the Court of Justice, in case of annulment of a 
regulation, may declare which effects of the annuJied regulation 
shaH remain in force. It is especially in Austrian constitutional Jaw 
that this system of "mitigated annulment" has been developed.13 
Here, the situation comes very close to that covered by the prospec-
tivity debate, but there are two important differences: the 
characteristic of a novel interpretation is not necessarily that it 
should be retrospective by its very nature (in fact, this is part of the 
debate); and normally, there are no legal provisions to settle this 
problem. As the American Supreme Court said in the linkletter 
case, the Constitution "neither prohibits nor requires " retro-
spective effect; and the two European courts had to tread on virgin 
ground in Defrenne and Marckx. On the contrary, the purpose of 
annulment is to "erase the past." I agree with those authors who 
submit that reasons of legal certainty underlie provisions on the 
courts' powers to uphold certain results of the annulled act, and 
that these same reasons give rise to case Jaw on prospective applica-
tion of novel interpretations of the existing law 18; but when they 
t 3 See for Germany: BVerfGE 16, BO (1963) on reapport ionment; for Italy : Corte 
costituzion.ale no. 8, 2 June 1956, I Giur.costit. 602, on powers of pre/etti. 
u See Rupp-von Brilnneck, Vlgoriti and Linde, " Admonitory functions of con-
stitutional courts," 20 Am.Jn.Comp.Law 387 (1972). 
t5 See Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial review in the contemporary world (lndianapolis 
1971), pp. 88 et seq. 
t6 Je.an.Victor Louis, Lohngleichheit vor dem Gericht der Europiiischen Gemein· 
schaften, Eur. Grundr. Zeitung 1976/178; H. Kutscher, M~thodes d'inter· 
pr~tation vues par un juge A la Cour (Rencontre judiciaire et universitaire 27-28 
septembre 1976, Luxembourg 1976), p. 142/45. 
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conclude that therefore the problem is identical, I respectfully 
disagree. 11 
II. WHEN TO APPLY PRoSPECTIVJTY? 
Before analysing and assessing the arguments for and against retro-
spectivity, we shall have to devote some of our attention to a more 
empirical problem: when do courts apply prospectivity, i.e., what 
conditions are to be met before judges feel an urge to proclaim 
prospective application of their rulings? 
Before prospectivity can even be considered, it must be clear 
that the decision is not just a further extension of existing case law, 
but that it really embarks upon a new course. There should be a 
"clear break with the past," as the American Supreme Court some-
times puts it 18; and Mapp v. Ohio is often quoted as one of the 
most outstanding examples of such a break. The " clear break " is 
easy to see in the Marckx case. " Evolution towards equality has 
been slow," says the Human Rights Court, "and reliance on the 
Convention to accelerate this evolution was apparently contemplated 
at a rather late stage "; and it recalls that only twelve years earlier 
a similar complaint had been rejected by the European Commission 
on Human Rights as manifestly ill-founded. It is more difficult to 
discern the " break " in Defrenne. In that case, the reasoning of 
the Court of Justice seems to imply that its decision follows logically 
from its earlier case law on direct effect of Treaty provisions. If the 
Court really thought so, it may have overstated its case. It is true 
that there was an important body of case law on the direct effect of 
Treaty provisions which only impose obligations on the Member 
States, but which do so in such a way that the result to be achieved 
is clearly and unconditionally fixed, e.g., on admission of advocates 19; 
but it is also true to say that these cases dealt with different situa-
tions : there, a citizen invoked the direct effect of the Treaty pro-
visions vis-a-vis an institution of the Member State whose obligations 
were thus clearly and unconditionally determined, whilst in Defrenne 
the direct effect had to do with a situation in the field of private law, 
of employee against employer.20 So, there may be a cc clear break," 
but the judgment itself is silent on it, and only implicitly admits it 
when considering the question of the cc temporal effect." 
This ambiguity in Defrenne may not merely be due to accident. 
11 See also Alphonse Kohl. " Observations sur la • non·r~troactivite • de l'autorlte 
de l'arr~t Defrenne," 31 Rev.crit.jurispr.belge 231 (1977). 
18 See Desist v. United Stales, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
19 Case 2/74, Reyners [1974] E.C.R. 631. 
2o See also C. 1. Harnson, " Methods of interpretation, a critical assessment or the 
results" (Judicial and Academic Conference 27-28 September 1976, Luxembourg 
19761, p. 1-17. 
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If the ruling on direct effect of Article 119 actually was a logical 
consequence of earlier case law, there would be little ground for 
not applying it retrospectively: workers, unions and corporations 
should have known, in that case, that the " direct-effect-doctrine " 
would also be applied to Article 119. If, in such a case, earlier 
decisions would not have clearly announced what the next step in 
the evolution of that doctrine would be, they would at least have 
" foreshadowed " this step. However, if we pursue the matter some-
what further in this direction, we discover a kind of logical problem 
in this field: it would not be unreasonable, at first sight, to say that 
only one of two possibilities can exist--either earlier case law gives 
some indication on the new course to be followed, or the new course 
is not foreshadowed at all; in the latter case it is difficult to see how 
a court could possibly come to its new interpretation (is a court 
doing what it ought to do, when its interpretation is so brand-new 
that no simple sign of ii can be found in its earlier decisions?), but 
in the first case, it is as difficult to imagine how citizens could 
possibly rely on the older case Jaw {they might have known bet-
ter ... ). When we put the problem in these abstract terms, we are, 
therefore, bound to deny any necessity of prospective application: 
either the courts reform after having foreshadowed, and retro-
spectivity is in order, or they don't foreshadow, but then they should 
stick to the line of their earlier case Jaw. Unhappily, most legal 
problems resist being defined away in this manner; there is, of 
course, a "large murky area" between continuing an established 
interpretation and making a clear break with the past. 21 
Nevertheless, our logical problem represents something more 
than just a play of words. So much is obvious when we turn to the 
·second condition which is generally regarded as necessary for apply-
ing prospectivity: citizens must have been relying on the law as it was 
interpreted previously. As an American author, Paul Mishkin, puts 
it: the only possible " rationale" for prospective application is that 
" retroactivity might unjustly inflict harm on those who justifiably 
relied on pre-existing authority." 22 This formula, attractive and 
simple though it may seem, raises three far from easy questions: 
when can one say that people have " relied" on pre-existing auth-
ority; and when is such reliance "justifiable"; and finally-of course 
-can reliance ever be justifiable if the new decision was fore-
shadowed? 
The problem of " reliance" is illustrated by the Iinkletter case. 
21 I borrow the term in quotation marks from Francis X. Beytagh, "Ten years of 
non-retroactivity, a critique and a proposal" 61 Virginia Law Rev. ISS1 (1975). 
2 2 Paul 1. Mishkio, "The High Court, the great writ and the due process of time 
and law" 79 Harv.L.Rev.56 (1965). 
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The petitioner had been prosecuted under state law, and his con-
viction had become final before Mapp was decided: whose reliance 
is then to be taken into account? The state prosecutor may have 
thought that he was right, the prison commissioners may have believed 
that they could lawful1y detain the convict- but the convict himself, 
though probably not aware of the subsequent change of the law, 
may have believed that injustice had been done to him as he went 
to prison on the basis of evidence which had been obtained 
irregularly. Particularly in criminal cases, the notion of reliance is 
one of difficult application. 
Should reliance always be "justifiable"? In Defrenne, the Court 
of Justice seemed to think that reliance bad not been entirely 
justifiable: 
However, in the light of the conduct of several of the Member 
States and the views adopted by the Commission and repeatedly 
brought to the notice of the circles concerned, it is appropriate 
to take exceptionally into account the fact that, over a pro-
longed period, the parties concerned have been led to continue 
with practices which were contrary to Article 119, although 
not yet prohibited under their national law. 
The fact that, in spite of the warnings given, the Commis-
sion did not initiate proceedings under Article 169 against the 
Member States concerned on grounds of failure to fulffi an 
obligation was likely to consolidate the incorrect impression as 
to the effects of Article 119. 
There is some reproach in this part of the reasoning: the citizens 
have been led to believe that Member States and the Commission 
knew what the law was (they should have known better, poor things). 
On the other hand, the text has obviously been drafted in a most 
careful way ("take exceptionally into account .. . ," "over a pro-
longed period ... ," etc.), and it is easy to see why. Without these 
qualifying terms, the judgment might be interpreted as meaning that 
non-compliance with Treaty provisions could give a certain advan-
tage, in so far that a non-complying Member State might be able 
to postpone the full effect of a certain rule to a later date. Some 
Member States, perhaps most, would probably like such a delay 
sometimes, though not all of them for the same subject-matter (some 
for mutton, some for fish). The Court of Justice, it appears, was 
conscious of this risk when it formulated its judgment. Nevertheless, 
the text has been drafted in such a way as to avoid the question 
whether reliance on the behaviour of the Member States and of the 
Commission was justifiable. In this respect, the Marckx judgment 
is more in conformity with Mishkin's standards: it also complains 
that "a large number of Contracting States" have "for many 
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years " regarded discrimination of illegitimate children " as per-
missible and normal," but its opinion that such a discrimination 
constitutes a violation of the Human Rights Convention is not 
founded on the inner logic of the Convention itself, but on the 
.. evolution towards equality," dubbed as .. slow "-all of which 
seems to imply that citizens and authorities could reasonably and 
justifiably believe that this particular form of discrimination might 
still last for some time. 
We devoted already some attention to the problem whether 
reliance can ever be justifiable if the new decision was foreshadowed. 
Suffice it to repeat here that it will be hard to find judicial decisions 
which are not foreshadowed at all; normally, case law is something 
which is gradually evolving. and even major breaks may be 
announced in one way or another. But if the break is foreshadowed, 
citizens might know that it would be unwise to put too much trust on 
previous decisions. It seems, after all, a matter of degree. 
The third condition for applying prospectivity has to do with 
the consequences which might result from retroactive application of 
the new interpretation. In Linkletter and similar cases, retroactive 
application of the Mapp rule might have bad a ''disruptive effect" 
on a good administration of justice: it might have resulted in a kind 
of judicial amnesty for all prisoners convicted on the basis of 
evidence obtained in an irregular way. Such a " general opening of 
prison doors " would indeed go very far. To take another example: 
in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court considered (or at least seemed to 
consider) capital punishment as "cruel and unusual," and therefore 
forbidden by the federal Constitution 23 ; if this new rule would 
have been made to act with full retrospectivity, the American 
penitentiary system would have been shaken in its foundations (the 
resulting crisis would have been the more acute as the Supreme 
Court overruled its 1972 decision some years later). The disruptive 
effect was probably also at the back of the Human Rights Court's 
mind in the Marckx case: it would require some imagination to 
predict what retroactive application might have done to, for instance, 
vested rights in estate, many years after the succession. Here also, 
one could speak of disruption of a good administration of justice. 
Again the Defrenne judgment is somewhat less explicit: 
The Governments of Ireland and of the United Kingdom have 
drawn the Court's attention to the possible economic con-
sequences of attributing direct effect to the provisions of Article 
119, on the ground that such a decision might, in many branches 
of economic life, result in the introduction of claims dating back 
to the time at which such effect came into existence. 
23 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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In view of the large number of people concerned, such 
claims, which undertakings could not have foreseen, might 
seriously affect the financial situation of such undertakings and 
even drive some of them to bankruptcy. 
Are these risks to be considered as a disruptive effect of retrospective 
application of the judgment? One could have some doubts: sudden 
wage increases may also result from a massive strike; more generally, 
they may be viewed as belonging to the normal risks of undertakings 
in economic life. 
The three elements we discussed (clear break with the past; 
reliance on pre-existing law; disruptive effect of retrospectivity) seem 
to constitute the conditions which make courts resort to prospective 
application. American literature often adds a fourth element: the 
"purpose" to be served by the new ruling 24; some Supreme Court 
decisions also refer to it.25 The court applied it, for example, when it 
established new rules for the composition of juries in capital cases: 
it rejected a plea for prospectivity, in spite of considerations of 
reliance and effect, because improper jury-selection standards were 
likely to undermine the integrity of the guilt-determining process. 26 
It is hard to see, however, why a similar argument would not be 
valid in the Linkletter case. And this, to my mind, illustrates the 
difficulty : the " purpose " argument cuts both ways. If the purpose 
of the new ruling is so important that it represents a break with the 
past, and therefore justifies prospectivity, the same importance will 
in most cases form an argument for applying the new ruling equally, 
i.e., to everybody, and therefore retrospectively. Take Mapp or 
Defrenne: their originality from a legal point of view, their social 
impact, and the ends they serve, make together the result that their 
influence will be felt throughout society; and that is an argument 
for prospectivity in so far as this influence may be disrupting, but 
an argument for retrospectivity in so far as the importance of that 
influence is liable to make unequal treatment of cases having arisen 
before or after a certain date a most unlucky device. 27 
From this point of view, it seems scarcely possible to find a 
satisfactory solution. A fictitious example may illustrate these 
doubts: let us assume that a constitutional court, or the European 
Court of Human Rights, will hold that any form of imprisonment 
24 See Francis Beytagh, op. cit., supra, note 21; Harry H. Wellington, "Common 
law rules and constitutional double standards : some notes on adjudication " 
83 Yale L.J. 221 (1973). 
25 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968}; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 
244 (1969). 
~' In Witherspoon, note 25. 
2: Van Gerven, op. cit., supra, note 12 accepts the "purpose" test for European 
law. 
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is a " cruel and unusual " or " inhuman or degrading " punishment, 
and therefore forbidden.28 Such a rl;lling cannot mean that prison 
doors will be opened immediately, for if the sentencing court would 
have known that imprisonment was illegal, it would have imposed 
other penalties, like a fine. Nevertheless, keeping convicts in gaol 
after the court's new ruling will hardly do: a refusal to give relief 
retroactively to prisoners serving a " cruel " or " inhuman " sentence 
would be most unsatisfactory, for what the court's new ruling comes 
down to is that keeping people in gaol is contrary to human dignity. 
Only those who are opposed to any form of prospectivity have a 
clear answer to this problem: it highlights, they argue, the inherent 
weakness of the prospectivity doctrine. They will maintain that only 
legislative measures can bring relief in cases like this; that only 
legislative and administrative bodies are in a position to put some 
form of punishment in the place of prison for those who are already 
serving their sentence; and that therefore courts overstep the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction when they resort to law-giving by 
way of interpretation. 
ill. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PROS PECfiVITY 
The main argument against prospective application is indeed that it 
"smacks of the legislative process ".20 It is up to the legislature, the 
argument runs, to introduce new rules of Jaw; in doing so, it can 
take care of problems of transition from the old Jaw to the new-
it will try to balance the disadvantages of imposing new rules to 
everybody, whatever his rights or expectations, with those of 
delaying a change of law which is desirable, or even, perhaps, over-
due. 30 The courts, on the contrary, "find and declare" the law, 
i.e., the existing law. This maxim holds good even if the courts 
find an application of the law which nobody else had foreseen: their 
superior knowledge of the law has the effect that citizens accept that 
the law has always been as the courts say it is. This is what I shall 
call the Blackstonian concept-but I might as well call it Monte-
squivian, or Madisonian. 
Is that concept out of date? Since Geny's works on methods of 
intepretation, one might say, we know better.31 Nearly a century of 
legal thinking taught us to be suspicious of strict demarcation lines 
between the areas of Jaw-giving and of law-finding. Accustomed 
u A most unlikely hypothesis: see Art. 2, par. I, and Art. 4, par. l , Eur. Conven· 
tion on Human Rights. 
29 The term is Mishkln's : op. cit. , supra, note 22. 
30 See also 0. Stocker op. cit., supra, note 2. 
31 The first ed.ition of Geny's Mbhodes d'interprbation et sources en droit privt! 
positi/ was published in 1899. 
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as we are to looking at what judges " really " do, and not at what 
they are supposed to do according to eighteenth or nineteenth 
century precepts, we tend to see much resemblance between, for 
example, the process of defining a new tort in a statute and that of 
extending one of the old tort notions in a judgment. Accordingly, 
we are rather inclined to think that legislative and judicial activities 
have a certain area in common. Modern authors on the law-finding 
process. like Larenz and Esser in Germany,3 : give a picture of 
judicial work which comes very close to what early nineteenth 
century commentators would have labelled as typical of legislative 
work. And it is easy to pile up allusions that all point in the same 
direction: one could think of the doctrine, once popular in the United 
States, that law is "what the courts say it is," of the sociological 
schools of jurisprudence, of the rebirth of the natural law tradition 
on the European continent, of the thesis of the " Richterstaat " 
(or "judicial state") in the German-speaking world, etc. To this 
whole panoply of learned opinion we can add something else : 
empirical studies on what judges do in fact when they decide a 
case, as well as a fairly general development in actual case law 
towards a somewhat more " activist " stand of the courts, confirm 
this evolution. Consequently, there can be scarcely any doubt left: 
the Blackstonian concept rests on a myth. 
This conclusion, however, does not make an end to the debate. 
According to some authors, the concept may be unrealistic, but it 
has the merit of expressing a symbolic idea of the judicial process 
on which much of the courts' prestige and power depends. 33 In other 
words: it may be a myth, but it is one by which we live. This argu-
ment cannot lightly be disposed of. Judicial decisions are not backed 
by the authority of popular election, by the force of arms, or by 
well-organised propaganda campaigns. as political decisions often 
are; but they rely on a moral force, which is none other than their 
submission to the law as it is, and not to the law as some may hope 
that it will become. For revolutionising the law, we can elect repre-
sentatives, hold demonstrations, submit petitions, or organise hunger 
strikes; for keeping the law we instituted the judiciary. To see the 
force of this argument, one should keep in mind the fate of unpopular 
judicial decisions: they can only claim acceptance if those who are 
to obey are convinced that these decisions reflect the law, and not 
just the political or moral opinions of nine, five or three " old men " 
(to quote Franklin D. Roosevelt's invective). Tite Court of Justice 
32 A summary, with many references to German literature, in Karl Engisch, 
"Einfilhrung in das juristische Denken" (Urban TaschenbUcher no. 80; 1st ed. 
Stuttgart 19.56). 
33 See particularly Mishkin, op. cit., supra, note 22. 
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of the European Communities has some experience with this dif-
ficulty, as one of its rulings on the Euratom Treaty led to some 
wrathful debates, and even to charges of "politicking," in the 
French Parliament. 34 
I find this a very difficult question: should an out-dated theory 
be propagated, only because it is useful? It would be too machiavel-
lian. However, there may be a way out. Perhaps, the abyss between 
the " realistic " or " modem " approach to the nature of judicial 
activities and that of the neo-Blackstonians is not as wide as it 
appears at first sight. If we refer to the Jaw as something the courts 
should be faithful to, we are not only referring to rules of law which 
legislative action has brought into the statute book, but also to those 
principles which form the backbone of the law, and which have 
performed this same function over the centuries. No Blackstonian 
would be easily willing to deny that " being faithful to the law " 
implies being faithful to such principles. The crux of our problem 
is then that old principles will have to be applied to new and unfore-
seen situations; and in the process, they may take a shape they had 
never shown before. It is this type of adjustment which brings us 
into the area where legislative and judicial activities come very 
close: principles of law may be actualised by a statute, but also by a 
court of law. Recent history of the principle of equal protection, 
particularly in the United States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, provides abundant material in that sense; it shows a large area 
of " concurrent " legislative and judicial activities. In the United 
States, the late fifties and early sixties showed a combined effort by 
the federal courts and the federal legislature to give substance to 
the principle of equal protection in the field of race relations. The 
Supreme Court took the lead; and it could do so because its decisions 
were anchored in constitutional principles. 3z New law framed by the 
courts has all the moral force of old law, when it is firmly rooted 
in ancient principles which have been, and still are, the very 
foundations of the rule of law. 
When we look at the problem of prospectivity from this per-
spective, we have to admit that it cannot be simplified into a mere 
question of observing the boundaries between the legislative and 
the judicial area; it is more complex than tbat. It is perhaps useful 
to recall that it was the very old principle of equal protection which 
was at the root of the Marckx case, as well as of Defrenne. The 
3 • Opinion 1/78, Draft Convention on nuclear installations (1978) E.C.R. 2151. 
See also debates on parliamentary questions put by Mr. Michel Debr~. Compte-
rendu des d~bats de l'Assembl~ Nationale de ]er juin 1979 et du 12 octobre 
1979, Journal Otficiel 1979 p. 4607-4611 and p. 8209-8212. 
35 See Louis Lusky, "By wbat right? " (Cbarlottesville V a. 1975). Chap. XIII. 
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Human Rights Court expressly refers to it, adding that it has to be 
interpreted " in the light of present-day conditions." 36 
We can be brief as far as a second argument against any form 
of prospective ruling is concerned. It is sometimes argued that the 
courts, if empowered to limit the effects of their decisions to the 
future, will be encouraged to ordain sweeping changes of the law: 
as the immediate consequences of their boldness can be mitigated, 
they will not be hampered by practical considerations (the " free-
wheeling " argument). 37 There is no evidence in support of this 
argument : Mapp, for example, was decided without expressing any 
thought about its temporal effect, and the same applies to many of 
the more daring judgments of the American Supreme Court, like 
the school cases, the reapportionment cases, etc. As far as the law 
of the European Communities is concerned, it seems most unlikely 
that the freewheeling argument could have played a role: Defrenne 
certainly is an important judgment, but there are other decisions by 
the Court of Justice which show a greater amount of judicial imagina· 
tion, or which have had more important social consequences. Retro-
spectivity is not necessarily a bar to far-reaching or imaginative 
judgments. 
IV. FORMS OF PROSPECfiVITY 
Before summing up our conclusions, we shall have to look into one 
other aspect of our problem, the different ways of softening retro-
spective effects. 
In Marckx, the effects of the judgment are entirely limited to the 
future- there is no single element of retrospectivity. It is obvious 
that this solution of " pure prospectivity " presents the double 
advantage of protecting legal certainty without encroaching on 
equal treatment of all citizens; it does, indeed, something like intro-
ducing a new law. Those for whom the equality principle presents 
the most decisive standard of justice will therefore, in general, favour 
pure prospectivity. As an American Supreme Court judge, Mr. 
Justice Douglas, put it: " ... even-handed justice requires either 
prospectivity only or complete retroactivity." 38 It is quite as obvious, 
though, that pure prospectivity has one major inconvenience: it 
discourages citizens from challenging existing practice. Nobody but 
a professor of law likes to litigate for the sheer pleasure of it, and 
there is no incentive if the litigant cannot benefit from the decision 
Z$ The case of the Human Rights Court is somewhal parlicular, as lhe Convention 
does not create rule-giving bodies; reference to " legislative " acts in that case 
must be taken to mean amendments to the Convention, e.g. , by additional 
Protocol. 
a: See Justice Harlan, concurring, in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). 
3a Justice Douglas, dissenting, In Adams v. Illinois, 40S U.S. 278 (1972). 
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he was able to obtain. The result of pure prospectivity is, therefore, 
somewhat paradoxical: as the function of the courts is not to rule 
but to adjudicate, it seems odd that courts should be allowed to 
establish a new interpretation without applying it to the plaintiff 
who raised the problem. For some courts, this paradox may not 
have a great importance; one could think in particular of the Human 
Rights Court, whose " adjudicating " functions are of a very special 
kind.30 It has all the characteristics of an international court, which 
declares whether certain acts of the states subject to its jurisdiction 
are in conformity with the Convention it is intended to interpret. 
The American courts are at the other end of the scale, as the federal 
Constitution expressly provides that their power extends to " cases 
or controversies." 40 In this respect; the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities holds an intermediate position: it may, for 
example, first act more or less as an international court when it 
condemns, on the basis of Article 169 of the E.E.C. Treaty, a 
Member State for having levied internal duties which were forbidden 
by the Treaty 4 1 ; but at a later stage, it may then have to solve some 
real " case or controversy ". if a business enterprise tries to recover 
duties unduly paid before the date of the Court's decision, and if a 
national court refers the matter to the Court of Justice under Article 
177 of the Treaty.•2 In the light of these considerations, the relative 
ease which guided the Human Rights Court in adopting pure 
·prospectivity may be explained. 
The real difficulty is that other forms of prospectivity may do 
more justice to the idea of " adjudication " by the courts, but that 
they run unavoidably into problems concerning equal treatment of 
citizens. If one compares Mapp to Linkletter, one gets the somewhat 
bitter impression that the accident decides who is to remain in 
prison. Defrenne is more subtle: it did not limit the retrospective 
effect of the decision to the case at hand, but it extended that effect 
lo all cases that were pending at the date of the judgment. That 
means that the prospective effect of the Court's holding could onJy 
be opposed to those who had taken no initiative to defend their 
rights. This choice does not discourage litigants from challenging 
illegal situations, and it could also be based on the old maxim " ius 
vigilantibus scriptum." Nevertheless, chance may have decided 
whether a female worker brought her action for equal pay during the 
week before or after the Defrenne judgment; thus, the Court of Justice 
39 See Art . 50 Eur. Convention on Human Rights. 
•o Art. Ill, s. 2, U.S. Constitution. 
«1 See Art. 95 E.E.C. 
H See for example case 33/76, Rewe Zentra/finQIJl (1976) E.C.R. 1989. 
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has not been able to eliminate the problem of what the American 
Supreme Court calls that of the "chance beneficiaries." •3 
One could very well imagine other techniques of defining 
categories that are allowed to benefit from a limited retrospective 
effect, according to the nature of the new rule to be introduced. 
In matters of income tax-normally levied on an annual basis-
it will be easier to find a clear dividing line than in matters of con-
tract or of criminal procedure. But whatever one is able to find out, 
one will always have to allow for some element of chance. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Two main conclusions seem to result from the foregoing considera-
tions. 
The first is that the practice of giving prospective effect to new 
case law is not necessarily an indication that the courts trespass upon 
areas traditionally reserved ·to legislative authorities. As Defrenne 
and Marckx convincingly demonstrate, some parts of the law are 
in movement although they are governed by principles of law which 
form part and parcel of legal tradition- in the case of the European 
courts of a common legal tradition. American: experience suggests 
that old principles may, in the hands of the courts, produce sur-
prisingly new solutions to legal problems: the considerable body of 
American case ·taw on equal protection may reflect " the aspirations 
and divisions of contemporary society," and it may have revolu-
tionised American law, but it has also had the· effect of giving finally 
soine kind of meaning to the " equal protection " clause of the 
XIVth Amendment to the American Constitution, somewhat less 
than a century after it had come into force. 4" It is quite possible 
that the development of European law has comparable surprises in 
store. Courts and legislatures should concur in framing legal principles 
in such a way that our legal systems can grapple with the social 
problems of our day. In some fields of the law, it is difficult to see 
how it could be otherwise. In the framework of the common 
agricultural policy, for example, ·where assessments of similarity 
or comparability have to be made in complicated economic situations, 
the Council of the E.E.C. and the Court of Justice will jointly con-
tribute to the process of giving shape to non-discrimination prin-
ciples 45; they simply have no other choice. It is a trite observation 
43 See Stovall v . Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
H Archibald Cox, The role of the Supreme Court in American Government (Oxford 
1976), Chap. Ill. 
45 Seo joint cases 124/76 and 20/77, Moulim et Hui/eries de Pont-a·Mousson (" griu: 
de mais ") (1977) E.C.R. 1795. 
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that courts and legislative bodies will achieve their contributions 
in their own different ways; but prospectivity is not necessarily 
part of these differences. If courts can open new avenues by inter-
preting legal principles, and if they are thus in a position to render 
judgments with great social impact, they should evidently be aware 
of the consequences of what they are doing. The retrospectivity-
prospectivity debate concerns these consequences. 
The second conclusion is less reassuring: there is no way of 
defining a set of criteria that would enable the courts to make their 
choice between retrospective and prospective application on the 
basis of fixed standards, and with a clear conscience. On every single 
occasion they will have to strike the balance between legal certainty 
on the one hand and equal protection on the other. In principle, 
every reform of the law, whether judge-made or not, is liable to 
bring harm to legal certainty, to disappoint people who placed their 
trust in the law as they used to know it; and the efforts which have 
been made to distinguish between " justifiable " and " unjustifiable " 
forms of reliance seem to have failed. In coping with this difficulty, 
legislative bodies can avail themselves of a great variety of methods 
which are not, or not always, open to the courts: they can, for 
example, when refusing a certain advantage to persons who believed 
they were entitled to it, substitute a different advantage. One of the 
sole things a court can do in such a case is to limit the effects of its 
ruling, i.e., to soften tbe consequences of retrospective application. 
However, in doing so it will either have to disappoint the petitioner 
who was right, by making an option in favour of pure prospectivity 
(and this is always a difficult thing to do for a court), or to make 
a distinction between some people who benefit from the legal 
reform and others who do not, because they have been too slow, or 
come too late. Consequently, limiting retrospective effects will always 
mean one of two evils: failing to adjudicate the conflict submitted 
to the court, or adjudicating it in such a way that the result is 
inherently in contradiction with equal protection. The graver this 
judicial violation of equality will seem to the judge, the more be will 
be inclined to sacrifice legal certainty, rather than equal treatment. 
In the last analysis, it would seem that retrospectivity is rightly 
considered as the normal system for judicial rulings. For most courts, 
though not for special courts such as the Human Rights Court, pure 
prospectivity would be too far removed from what they consider as 
their essential function: rendering justice in a conflict between two 
parties. Every more limited form of softening the effects of retrospec-
tivity will, however, compel the courts to appreciate whether uphold-
ing citizens' interests in legal certainty will not unduly downgrade the 
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principle of equality before the law. They wiiJ have to choose, in 
every case in issue, which of the two evils is worse. 
This conclusion may sound somewhat disappointing to those 
who like clear-cut solutions to legal problems. Perhaps. some parts 
of the law are not yet sufficiently charted to permit straight sailing. 
It is also possible, however, that "the variety of controversies which 
grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind," Hamilton 's 
explanation for the " laboriousness" of the law!• can also help to 
explain why cJear solutions are not always good solutions . 
.a The Federalist, no. LXXVIll (Everyman's ed. p . 401). 
